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Social Security and the
American Family
Expected Social Security retirement benefits are the largest single "as-
set" available to most Americans. Social Security is also the source of the
largest tax burden for a majority of American workers. Because the pro-
gram is so large and complex, it is important to understand the invest-
ment deal it offers persons and families in different situations, as well as
the aggregate financial and economic implications of the program and
any change in it. Expected benefits depend on a varietyof factors, such
as one's marital status, age, sex, age-earnings profile,length of career,
number of children, other income sources in retirement, and so on.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a number of important issues
associated with the "deal" and incentives projected to be offered by the
current Social Security system, especially with respect to its treatment of
the family. By treatment of the family, we mean the expected benefits,
taxes, rates of return, and marginal benefits per incremental dollar of
taxes paid for persons in different family situations: married versus single,
number of earners in the family and the division of earnings between
them, the special situation of widows and divorcees, and so on.
Although a number of authors have commented on various features of
the Social Security system affecting people in these different situations,1
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we believe it is worthwhile to refocus attention on these specific issues in
light of some important factors. Among these are the substantial
changes introduced by the 1983 Social Security amendments, the chang-
ing actuarial projections used as the intermediate assumptions in the
last few years, the dramatic changes in life expectancies, and the rapid
change of the structure of American families toward more episodes of
divorce, more single person households, and more common and length-
ier widowhood than several decades ago, to name a few.
We begin by pointing out that Social Security offers very different ex
ante "deals" and marginal returns for incremental taxes paid to persons
of different income, family status, age, sex, and income. Although this
may or may not be desirable, the extent of the differences is not widely
appreciated. In particular, a substantial fraction of some subgroups in
the population receive virtually nothing back for incremental taxes paid.
Therefore, an important problem of Social Security is that it may rightly
be perceived primarily as a tax and not as a savings scheme.
Among the features that treat persons of different family status differ-
ently in Social Security are the following:
The progressivity of the benefit formula
Survivors' benefits
Spousal benefits
Rules governing eligibility of divorced persons
The ceiling on Social Security taxable earnings
The taxation of one half of benefits over a certain income level for per-
sons receiving benefits
Child survivors' benefits
The person's age cohort reflecting the maturity of the system and,
therefore, their entire tax history.
Each of these factors interacts with the important nonSocial Security
features of differential life expectancies for different groups, most im-
portantly for the issues discussed here, for maless and females, and the
differential wage-level trajectories typical of males and females in the
labor force.
There is a substantial variation in the typical Social Security benefits of
female new beneficiaries, depending upon whether they receive the
spouse benefit, their own worker benefit, or, in the case of widows, sur-
vivor benefits. Of new female beneficiaries in 1982, 64 percent were part
of married couples, and 24 percent were widows. For the former, the
most common benefit was the spouse benefit; for the latter, the survivorSOCIAL SECURITY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 141
benefit. Only about 30 percent of women who were ever married re-
ceived benefits based on their own earnings history.2
As can be seen from this list of features of Social Security and other
factors affecting the deal and the marginal linkages of benefits and taxes,
the situation is rather complex. To clarify these issues, we organize the
paper as follows. Section 1 presents a cursory literature review and a de-
scription of our data and methodology. Section 2 presents some com-
parisons among households with different earnings splits and different
levels of earnings. We examine a single-earner couple and examples of
two-earner couples where the earnings split is two thirds and one third
between the husband and wife or fifty-fifty between the husband and
wife. We present the expected present value of taxes paid, benefits re-
ceived, and transfers, and, therefore, the expected internal rate of return
on taxes paid for three total family earnings levels indexed to1985:
$10,000, $30,000, and$50,000.These projections are made for the cohort
of persons born in1945.Our primary purpose here is not to discuss the
intergenerational issues but rather the intragenerational issues of differ-
ential treatment of persons in different family status. The differences
often amount to more than the value of a typical family house.
Also presented in section 2 is a discussion of the second-earners' range
of zero-marginal return. The issue here is how much a wife must earn,
for a given level of her husband's earnings, before she begins to receive
any incremental return for the Social Security taxes she pays. We also
discuss single males versus single females, and singles versus couples.
The presence of spousal and survivors' benefits clearly changes the deal
offered to couples versus singles.
Section 3 analyzes the marriage penalty or subsidy, that is, how a man
and a woman fare under Social Security if they marry relative to how
they fare if they stay single. The amounts involved are substantial, ex-
ceeding the more hotly debated marriage penalty in the personal in-
come tax.
Section4discusses the situation for widows and divorcees. We pre-
sent similar information on the present value of benefits, taxes, trans-
fers, and rates of return, including those in which the widow worked or
did not work prior to the assumed date of death of the husband. We also
present the various situations defining the range of earnings widows
would make without receiving any incremental Social Security bene-
fits, or for nonworking wives, who start work at two thirds of their hus-
Social Security Administration (1985).
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bands' wage upon widowhood, the age after which they would receive
no incremental Social Security benefits despite payment of substantial
taxes. Analogous results are presented for divorcees. For the latter, a tre-
mendous incentive exists to postpone divorce until after ten years of
marriage. The financial stake can exceed $50,000.
Section 5 discusses the issue of the marginal linkage of benefits and
taxes in more detail. The relation of the expected present value of bene-
fits received for an incremental dollar of taxes paid varies substantially
by family status and earnings level.
Section 6 discusses some parallel stories for the cohort born in 1975,
given the actuarial projections of the Social Security Administration, ig-
noring any potential long-term financial solvency problems of the sys-
tem, and accounting for several changes relative to the 1945 cohort.
Section 7 offers a brief conclusion and summary of the results.
1. The Present Study in Perspective
Several studies have attempted to estimate the "deal" different house-
holds receive or can expect to receive in the future from the Social Security
retirement program. It is well known that the early cohorts of retirees had
very large rates of return on their taxes and that future retirees, espe-
cially wealthy ones, will not fare well relative to rates of return available
on private assets.4
The primary contribution of this study is to update the results to the
post-1983 amendments situation (of the studies cited, only Pellechio and
Goodfellow (1983), Boskin (1986), and Boskin et al. (1986) do so), allow
for recent changes in the Social Security Administration's actuarial as-
sumptions about future economic and demographic factors, present a
wider range of cases, examine the marginal linkage between taxes paid
and benefits received, and focus in particular on the situation of women
in these updated cases (supplementing the important work in the Bur-
khauser and Holden volume).
We use a computer simulation to convert assumptions about house-
holds' wages, expected mortality, and economywide growth in real
wages into expected present values of Social Security taxes, benefits, net
transfers, and internal rates of return. We also thus derive the mar-
4. A sample of such studies includes Boskin, Avrin, and Cone (1983), Hurd and Shoven
(1985), Boskin (1986), Pellechio and Goodfellow (1983), Flowers (1977), Ricardo-Camp-
bell (1977), and several studies in the book by Burkhauser and Holden (1982), pf particu-
lar importance because it focuses on the role of women in the Social Security system as it
existed at the time the essays were written and under various alternatives. See also
Boskin et al. (1986) and the survey by Thompson (1983).SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 143
ginal linkage between incremental taxes paid and incremental benefits
received.5
2. Comparisons Among Households (1945 Cohort)
Social Securityboth when it was introduced and every time it was ex-
pandedhas been a major vehicle for transferring resources from the
younger, richer, working generation to the older, poorer, retired genera-
tion. But these transfers do not occur uniformly across different types of
families. Tables 1 and3show how the expected present value of benefits,
taxes, and transfers for single men and women of different income levels
and for married couples vary with different levels and composition of
income. In Table 1, we note that moving from single-earner households
to an identical earnings stream split between the couple reduces the
expected present value of benefits and the expected present value of
transfers substantially for all three earnings levels considered. The "deal"
as measured by the internal rate of return on expected taxes paid wors-
ens as we move toward a more equal division of the earnings and, ob-
viously, as we move for any type of household to higher earnings levels.
For example, a couple with$30,000(at the1985wage index) in which the
husband was the sole earner would receive a2.3percent internal rate of
return on$136,498taxes paid and therefore suffer a$27,370loss, dis-
counting benefits and taxes at a3percent real rate of return. The corre-
sponding numbers for a two thirdone third and one halfone half split
5. Obviously, to conduct these analyses, one must make various assumptions. We consider
households that vary in several attributes: marital status, year of birth, the amount of
total earnings and its division between wife and husband. We calculate expected taxes
and benefits using mortality probabilities computed separately for males and females,
and separate mortality tables are used for different cohorts. The tables used are those
prepared for the intermediate assumptions in the 1983 Reportofthe Trusteesofthe Old Age
and Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Funds.
All earnings levels reported in tables below correspond directly to twenty-five-year
olds in 1985. We assume that wages for males increase 1 percent per year of age, and for
females 0.5 percent per year of age, until age fifty. Thus, for the 1945 cohort, male wages
in 1985 will be about 16 percent higher than earnings levels listed, since the males will be
forty rather than twenty-five, and female wages will be nearly 8 percent higher for the
same reason. Earnings levels also vary annually with economywide wage growth. We
use the Social Security Administration's intermediate wage growth assumption (roughly
1.5 percent per year beyond inflation) from the 1985 Reportofthe Trusteesofthe Old Age
and Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Funds.
We estimate the expected taxation of one half of future benefits to the extent that that
portion of one's benefits plus other adjusted gross income exceeds the nonindexed
threshold levels of $25,000 for singles and $32,000 for couples. We use the tax law in
existence when this paper was written. The results would vary somewhat given the re-
duction in marginal tax rates in the tax law about to be phased in.
For further details, see Boskin et al. (1986).144 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
of income, adding to $30,000, are 1.75 percent and 1.45 percent for the
rate of return and transfers of -$48,715 and -$54,199. Thus, for the
same earnings levels, we see the pattern repeated. Not only does the rate
of return vary by family type and earnings level, but there is a substan-
tial interaction between the two. For example, for single-earner house-
holds, the rate of return received by a $50,000 earning household is
about one half that for the $10,000 household (1.95 percent versus 3.74
percent), whereas for the households with the equal division of earnings
the comparable numbers are 0.61 percent versus 3.81 percent, a fivefold
rather than a twofold ratio. Clearly, the interaction of the spouse benefit
and the incremental taxes paid as the spouse earns a greater amount of
taxable income worsens the deal substantially.
Table 2 reports the range of zero-incremental returns for the 1945 co-
hort for the second earner. For the same three earnings levels for the pri-
mary earner, we derive the mininum earnings level per year to receive
any incremental return from Social Security taxes paid by the second
earner (rather than just collecting the spouse's benefits and "losing" all
Social Security taxes paid). Note that this calculation understates the
minimum earnings level necessary for second earners with intermittent
Table 1COMPARISON ACROSS DIVISIONS OF HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS
FOR 1945 COHORT, VARIOUS EARNINGS LEVELS (1985 DOLLARS
DISCOUNTED AT RATE 3 PERCENT TO 1985)
Division of earnings
(Husband-wife)
Total family earnings level
(At 1985 wage index)
10,000 30,000 50,000
1-0 (single earner)
P.V. benefits 62,679 109,128 100,503
P.V. taxes 48,951 136,498 140,253
P.V.transfer 13,727 -27,370 -39,750
Rate of return 3.74% 2.30% 1.95%
2/3_½
P.V. benefits 53,293 96,044 108,428
P.V. taxes 48,264 144,760 218,119
P.V. transfer 5,029 -48,715 -109,689
Rate of return 3.30% 1.75% 0.80%
½-½
P.V. benefits 50,936 89,578 109,457
P.V. taxes 47,926 143,777 233,433
P.V. transfer 3,010 -54,199 -123,975
Rate of return 3.18% 1.54% 0.61%SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 145
work histories because it is assumed that this1985earnings level will
continue each year until retirement.6 For those who step out of the work
force for a long time, the numbers would be much larger. As an example,
consider the primary earner who is earning$30,000per year. If the spouse
goes to work, he or she would have to earn almost $10,000 per yearbe-
fore receiving any incremental return. In short, the first$9,600per year
of earnings upon which over $1,000 of taxes would be paid (by the em-
ployee and employer) would result in no incremental return to the Social
Security benefits for the couple. This is another way to view the differ-
ences between the different earnings splits of families.
In short, there is a substantial tax on married women's labor force
participation through the spouse's benefit. Until the married woman's
own earnings history (if any) is sufficient to produce benefits beyond the
spouse's benefit, the entire Social Security payroll tax is a pure tax, with
no corresponding presumption of future incremental Social Security
benefits. Since the Social Security payroll tax for Old Age and Survivors
Insurance exceeds 10 percent and is expected to rise, this is a substantial
extra tax bite at the margin (we make the usual presumption that the em-
ployee bears both the employer and the employee component of the tax
to be a reasonable first approximation). Under the new income tax re-
forms, this raises marginal tax rates about 70 percent and35percent for
those in the15percent and28percent brackets, respectively.
Table3presents a comparison among single-earner couples, single
males, and single females at various earnings levels. The story is much the
same as that reported above for single-earner versus two-earner couples,
although singles, especially single males, fare especially poorly. The rea-
son why single-earner couples do so well reflects the extrabenefits due
to the joint survivor nature of Social Security benefits for the same taxes
paid. Different life expectancies are responsible for the male and female
differences among singles. The single-earner couple collects the spouse
6. The retirement benefit of the spouse is based on an average indexed monthly earning
that would include a substantial number of years of coverage.
Table 2 SECOND EARNER'S RANGE OF ZERO INCREMENTAL RETURN
"In this simulation, both earners' wages increase at the male age proffle of wages.
(1945 COHORT)
First earner's earning level 10,000 30,000 50,000
Second earner's minimum earnings level
to receive an incremental return" 2,900 9,600 10,000146 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
benefit while both are alive, and survivor benefits are received by a sur-
viving spouse if the single earner has died first. Clearly, in the case of
singles, there are by definition no survivors to receive such benefits.
Hence, the expected present value of taxes paid is quite similar at each
earnings level for each of the three types of households, but the ex-
pected present value of benefits differs enormously.
For example, at the $30,000 level the expected present value of taxes is
about $136,000 for single males and single-earner couples, and only a
few thousand dollars less for single females.7 However, the expected
present value of benefits ranges from $52,000 for single males to $109,000
for the single-earner couple.
In brief summary, these tables reveal enormous differences in the ex-
pected present value of benefits and rates of return on taxes paid to dif-
ferent family types at each earnings level and the important interaction
of family type and earnings level in determining the "deal" various fami-
lies get from Social Security. Although these data are interesting and
instructive, we need to probe more deeply into the situation facing wid-
7. The difference is due to assumptions concerning mortality probabilities and how earn-
mgs rise with age.
Table 3 COMPARISON AMONG SINGLE-EARNER COUPLES, SINGLE
MALES, AND SINGLE FEMALES OF 1945 COHORT, VARIOUS EARNINGS
LEVELS (1985 DOLLARS DISCOUNTED AT RATE 3 PERCENT TO 1985)
Earnings level
(At 1985 wage index)
Family type 10,000 30,000 50,000
Single-Earner Couple
P.V. benefits 62,679 109,128 100,503
P.V. taxes 48,951 136,498 140,253
P.V. transfer 13,727 -27,370 -39,750
Rate of return 3.74% 2.30% 1.95%
Single Male
P.V. benefits 29,913 52,282 48,532
P.V.taxes 48,951 136,498 140,253
P.V. transfer -19,038 -84,216 -91,721
Rate of return 1.42% -0.25% -0.60%
Single Family
P.V.benefits 40,306 71,715 69,590
P.V. taxes 46,901 130,802 144,723
P.V. transfer -6,595 -59,087 -75,133
Rate of return 2.55% 1.13% 0.68%SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 147
owed and divorced persons. This is especially true because of the likeli-
hood that they will be receiving benefits that are quite low, that they may
well be the group in the population most likely to be poor in old age,8
and because changing family conditions and life expectancies in the
United States render the treatment of widows and divorced persons in-
creasingly important in the evaluation of the adequacy and cost effective-
ness of Social Security benefits.
3. Marriage and Children
Social Security creates important incentives and provides various sub-
sidies or penalties to family creation and dissolution. For example, there
is a huge financial stake in staying married for ten years for those con-
templating divorce after a few years of marriage (detailed more fully in
section 4). Likewise, Social Security provides some auxiliary benefits for
children, especially child survivor benefits. But because of the evolution
of the system, these same children will in the future likely pay much
more in taxes than they will receive in benefits. Finally, becauseSocial
Security provides both spouse benefits and spousal survivor benefits,
and also because marriage may raise the marginal income tax rate that
is applied to one's benefits, a single male and a single female contemplat-
ing marriage may face a marriage penalty or subsidy.
Table 4 presents calculations of this marriage subsidy or penalty for
various combinations of the (newly married) husband's and wife's earn-
ings levels, assuming that both spouses continue working on the same
earnings path. One very important Social Security subsidy is demon-
strated in the entries in the table with zero for "wife's earnings" and in
the columns for "wife stops working." In each of these situations, the
couple gets a subsidy given by the spouse's benefit. The subsidy exceeds
$50,000 in virtually every case. Thus, these couples do much better under
SQcial Security married than as singles. Although the wife leaving her
job upon marriage is an extreme case, we present these numbers to indi-
cate the value of that "option" to the married couple over its lifetime. For
those couples where both spouses continue to work and the wife's earn-
ings are sufficient to generate her own worker's benefits, the table also
demonstrates that higher income taxes paid on a portion of Social Secu-
rity benefits more than offsets the extra value of the survivor's benefit
based on the husband's (possibly high) earnings. This penalty can amount
to $9,000 or $10,000 when discounted at 3 percent, considerably more
8. See Boskin and Shoven (1986).148 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
when discounted at lower rates. This sum is modest relative to the sub-
sidies to the nonworking spouses.
That is not the end of the story, however. Most of those singles who
marry will have children, and they in turn wifi probably pay consider-
ably more in taxes than they receive back in benefits. Although this is
unlikely to be of major concern in marriage or fertility decisions, it is
interesting to note the expected change in family finances, including the
impact from the children's taxes and benefits. Such hypothetical sce-
narios are presented in Table 5. For several combinations of parents'
earnings and children's expected earnings, we see that the "bad deal" the
children get offsets the subsidy to nonworking spouses and substantially
increases the marriage penalty for working spouses. The table considers
hypothetical singles from the 1945 cohort who marry and (for simplicity)
have two children (one male, one female) in 1975. We assume that the
Table 4 MARRIAGE SUBSIDY OR PENALTY (1945 COHORT; 1985 DOLLARS
DISCOUNTED AT 3 PERCENT TO 1985)
Table 5 "DEAL" FOR FAMILY (INCLUDING ESTIMATED TREATMENT
OF CHILDREN) FROM MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN' (1945 AND 1975
COHORTS; 1985 DOLLARS, DISCOUNTED AT 3 PERCENT TO 1985)
Husband's Wife's Wife stops
earnings level earnings level Wife works working








(Change in benefits =
change in net transfer)
Wife stops working





$30,000$30,000 -9,551 -25,305-103,170 77,865
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children have one earner with the same relative earnings as their father.9
Since each future couple has two sets of parents, we attribute one half of
the deal to each child in this couple.
Social Security provides various incentives and redistributions be-
cause of its many rules and features, such as the spouse benefit, the sur-
vivor benefit, and taxation of earnings of individuals (as opposed to
families). In some cases, as documented above, the redistribution is
large relative to the disputes over features of the personal income tax.
Some of the marriage subsidies are much larger than the annual small
marriage penalty in the income tax. The marriage penalties, combined
with the poor deal for children can be many times the marriage penalty
in the income tax. Whether the marginal incentives are sufficient to
change behavior in labor force participation and family formation and
dissolution is less obvious. Clearly, some of the incentives, such as stay-
ing married a tenth year if contemplating divorce after nine years of mar-
riage, are likely to be so strong as to affect behavior noticeably. That the
spouse benefit renders the payroll tax a pure tax with no incremental re-
turn undoubtedly reduces the labor supply of married women. Other in-
centives exist, but they may only affect behavior slightly, if at all.
4. Widowhood and Divorce
Tables 6 and 7 present comparable information to that presented above
for archetypical situations for widowed and divorced women. Compa-
rable information could be generated for widowers and divorced men,
but they are, at least historically, of somewhat less interest given the
much higher male labor force participation rates than those for females.
The projected treatment of widows born in 1945 at various earnings lev-
els and discounted to constant 1985 dollars reveals some interesting
facts. Our archetypical situation contemplates a widow who loses her
husband when they are both age fifty. The expected present value of
benefits includes, where applicable, survivor benefits and retired worker
benefits. The present value of taxes includes taxes paid by the husband
before his death. As we can see by comparing Tables 6 and 1, widows
who lose their husbands at relatively early ages get a much poorer inter-
nal rate of return than surviving couples of comparable earnings levels.
The rates of return for widows in the middle and upper earnings range
are quite low, even negative for those who were working and will con-
tinue to work after their husbands' death. Take the example of the one
halfone half earnings split: the widow who is from a couple where each
9. Note that this means the negative transfers are the smallest for any of the family patterns.150 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
Table 6 TREATMENT OF WIDOWS' OF 1945 COHORT, VARIOUS
EARNINGS LEVELS (1985 DOLLARS DISCOUNTED AT RATE 3 PERCENT
TO 1985)
'That is, widows who lose their husbands at age fifty.
bindudes taxes paid by husband before his death.
Table 7 WIDOWS' AND DWORCED WOMEN'S RANGE OF ZERO
INCREMENTAL BENEFITS (1945 COHORT)
Husband's Earnings Level
Widow's minimum earnings level
to receive an incremental return'
Latest age at which widowhood occurs,
and widow first begins work at ½
of husband's wage, to receive an
incremental return'
Divorced woman's minimum earnings
level to receive an incremental
return'
Latest age at which divorce occurs,
and divorced woman first begins
work at ½ of husband's wage, to
receive an incremental return'
'In this simulation, both earners' wages increase at the male age profile of wages.
Division of earnings
(Husband-wife)
Total family earnings level
(At 1985 wage index)
10,000 30,000 50,000
1-0 (single earner)
P.V. benefits 41,025 74,012 69,201
P.V.taxes" 36,056 97,771 101,570
P.V. transfer 4,969 -23,759 -32,369
Rate of return 3.33% 2.28% 2.00%
2/3_½
P.V. benefits 33,704 57,930 69,115
P.V.taxest' 40,141 120,390 181,75
P.V. transfer -6,437 -62,460 -112,680
Rate of return 2.53% 1.01% 0.30%
½-½
P.V. benefits 34,068 58,954 73,405
RV.taxes" 42,189 126,566 204,742
P.V.transfer -8,121 -67,612 -131,337
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earner earned $25,000 (adjusted to the1985 wage level) would lose
$131,000 because she and her deceased husband paid in taxes of $204,000
and received back $73,000 in expected present value of benefits. The in-
ternal rate of return is barely over zero percent. Only for single-earner,
low-income households do widows receive a rate of return comparable to
our assumed 3 percent discount rate.
In comparing similar columns and rows from Table 6 with those in
Table 1, note several important facts. First, Table 1 is completely ex ante;
that is, everything is in expected value terms.3° Table 6 is somewhat ex
post: we have presumed that the husband survived to agefifty and the
widow to retirement age, and we use mortality probabilities of 1 at age
fifty for the husband and the life table mortality probabilities beyond age
sixty-six for the surviving wife. Second, we assume that widowsof single-
earner households do not go back towork. Such a widow may in fact
begin work but will not be able to work enough to increase herbenefits
beyond the spousal survivor benefit. Because she wifi pay substantial
taxes with no return in benefit, she wifi be worseoff than the table actu-
ally suggests. The same is true for the two thirds-one third earnings
split; continuing to work at the same earnings level, the widowwill get
more as a survivor than as a retiredworker, and hence get nothing for
incremental taxes paid for the remainder of her work life. However,
when each spouse earns half the income, the widow wifi get more as a
retired worker than as a survivor if she continues to work at the same
earnings level. Third, we ignore the possibility of remarriage forthe pur-
pose of this calculation.
Again, as for married women, we present the range of conditions gen-
erating zero incremental benefits for widows and divorced women.These
conditions are presented for three presumed (1985 indexed) husbands'
earnings levels: $10,000, $30,000, and $50,000. The data arepresented in
two ways. First, we consider the minimum earningslevel necessary for a
woman to receive an incremental return.Second, we consider the latest
age at which widowhood or divorcecould occur in order for a woman to
receive an incremental benefit if the woman only then first begins work
at two thirds of the husband's wage rate(slightly higher than the average
ratio of female to male wages). Thus, in the first panel we note thatfor a
husband's earning level of $10,000, a woman who is widowed at agefifty
would need to earn $7,500 (indexed) per year for the remainderof her
work life to receive any incremental return whatsoever. All taxespaid
under $7,500 (indexed) would result in zero incremental return.The
analogous numbers for widows of husbands earning $30,000 a yearand
10. Thus Table 1 includes the case of early widowhood weighted by itsprobability.152 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
$50,000 a year are indeed large: $21,000 and $22,000, respectively. Thus,
a widow who returns to work full time for the remainder of her work life,
earns up to $20,000, and is responsible for joint employee and employer
payroll taxes for retirement of well over $2,000 a year would be receiving
no incremental return.
In the second panel, we present the latest age at which widowhood
could occur, and the widow begin work, for the widow to receive an in-
cremental return. For the three earnings levels, these ages are 39, 41, and
45. Thus, only a woman widowed quite young who goes back to work
earning two thirds of her husband's wages over her remaining work life
will receive any incremental return. The rate of return will stifi be quite
modest, because the contributions by and on behalf of her husband wifi
generate no return for she will switch from survivor benefits to retired
worker benefits.
The table also presents analogous information for divorcedwomen. Re-
call that women who are married for less than ten years do not "vest" in
the husband's earnings records. Conversely, any given earnings history
may generate more than one divorced person's benefit if there were two
or more marriages that lasted ten years or more, apparently a growing
phenomenon in the United States. Women do not lose from remarriage
because they can get benefits based on a former spouse's earnings his-
tory. The corresponding earnings levels for women married for more than
ten years, and hence entitled to the spouse benefit based on their ex-
husband's entire earnings history, to receive any incremental benefits at
all are $2,900, $9,600, and $10,000, considerably less than for widows.11
Correspondingly, the latest age at which divorce could occur (assum-
ing on remarriage) and the divorced worker go to work at two thirds of
the husband's earnings rate and receive any incremental benefitsare 51,
49, and 54, respectively. If the woman's earnings record is considerably
smaller than two thirds of the projected earnings of the divorced hus-
band, these ages would be considerably younger. Of course, a divorced
person who is not vested in her spouse's earnings history receives incre-
mental benefits as soon as she goes to work.
These data reveal several interesting facts. First, there is an enormous
incentive to postpone divorce until the ten-year "vesting" period is com-
pleted. For example, in a one-earner couple with the husband earning
$30,000 indexed to 1985, a divorce after nine years of marriage would
cost the divorcee about $35,000$40,000 discounted to 1985! This is more
than the median net financial assets of U.S. households.
11. They need only achieve a retired worker benefit equal to one half that of their husbands
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In an era when life expectancies are growing (especially for women
who have already reached traditional retirement ages) and when divorce
and remarriage have become much more prevalent, these enormous
variations in the treatment of different individuals, some of whom may
differ little in when their widowhood or divorce occurred, suggest that
continued pressure wifi be placed upon Social Security to reform the na-
ture of its taxation and benefit payments to families and individuals.
5. The Marginal Linkage Between Benefits and Taxes
We have presented several types of information for various types of
households, including widows, and divorcees, traditional one-earner
and two-earner couples, single males, and single females. Most of the
information concerns the expected present value of total taxes paid, ex-
pected present value of total benefits received, and, therefore, the life-
time transfer, as well as the internal rate of return, on expected taxes
paid. We have discussed some issues of incremental linkage, such as the
age or the earnings at which a person would start to earn their retired
worker benefits and begin to receive an incremental return on their
taxes, switching over from spousal, survivor, or divorced person's retire-
ment benefit.
It is instructive to note the discounted expected marginal benefit for
marginal taxes paid (we assume the extra taxes are spread over the life-
time in proportion to earnings). We present this information in Table 8 to
give some idea of the marginal linkage for archetypical couples and
singles. For each of our archetypical earnings levels, the table considers
for male or female the discounted expected extra benefits paid for a dol-
lar of extra taxes spread over the lifetime. These data are for the cohort
born in 1960, who have recently entered the labor force, and are dis-
counted to 1985 with a 3 percent real discount rate. Four cases of family
status are presented: one-earner couple, two-earner couple where each
is presumed to earn one half of the earnings, single males, and single
females. Some remarkable facts emerge.
In no case is the marginal linkage as high as one hundred percent. No-
body gets back an incremental dollar for an incremental dollar of tax
paid. The figures presented in Table 8 range from a marginal linkage as
low as $0.12 on the dollar for a female in a high-wage, two-earner couple
and $0.15 on the dollar for a single male of middle income to $0.73 on the
dollar for a low-income male in a one-earner couple. Note that for some
of the entries in the table the particular case involved is at the maximum
tax; hence, there can be no additional taxes considered as part of this
experiment. Note also that in a one-earner couple, the female receives154 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
nothing for an incremental dollar of taxes paid. The female would have to
earn a substantial amount of earnings to generate expected Social Secu-
rity benefits in excess of the spouse's benefit received by the couple inde-
pendent of any earnings she may produce.
For two-earner couples, the discounted expected incremental benefit
per incremental tax paid differs for males and females. The extra linkage
to male taxes for a couple involves the joint survivor annuity nature of
Social Security benefits in the single-earner case and the survivor bene-
fits for the wife in the two-earner case. The reduced linkage for two-
earner wives occurs because she collects survivor benefits rather than re-
tired worker benefits after her husband dies.
There are many reasons why we might be interested in marginal link-
age in addition to or instead of total returns. First, to the extent that the
complicated system eventually becomes understood,12 it is the marginal
linkage that determines the extent to which Social Security's payroll tax
wifi be thought of as a tax rather than as forced saving. To the extent that
it is thought of as a tax, it will substantially increase the effective mar-
ginal tax rate on labor earnings, worsening the labor market distortion
caused by higher marginal tax rates. Finally, equity may be thought of as
equal treatment of people at the margin as well as on average. We make
no claim for this, but identical treatment of people at the margin can lead
to vastly different treatment of people on average, and vice versa. We
merely present the numbers for additional information.
12. This may be more reflective of a person getting close to retirement, attempting to
gather information and to calculate what their benefits will be under different stages of
retirement and continued earnings levels than for the general population.
Table 8 DISCOUNTED EXPECTED MARGINAL BENEFIT PER MARGINAL
TAXES PAID, WITH EXTRA TAXES SPREAD OVER LIFETIME (FOR 1960
COHORT AT 3 PERCENT REAL DISCOUNT RATE)
1-Earner 2-Earner Single Single
Earnings levelContributor couple couple male female
$10,000 Male .730 .546 .348-
Female 0 .301- .474
$30,000 Male .338 .517 .150-
Female 0 .286- .205
$50,000 Male * .216 *-
Female 0 .119- *
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6. Evolution of the System
Tables 9, 10, and 11 present some information, comparable to that pre-
sented earlier, for a later cohort, that born in 1975. Obviously, projecting
the future over the lifetimes of these individuals and families is subject to
a greater range of error than for the younger cohorts. Among the reasons
are the potential financial solvency problems that Social Security may
face in the future, which include the expected long-term actuarial deficit
in Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), which may be-
come larger due to the reduced reflow of income credited to Social Secu-
rity when the new tax bill passes (which will lower marginal tax rates
and hence the tax rate applicable to one half of Social Security benefits
received by well-off retirees); and, indeed, Social Security's retirement
and disability funds are scheduled to accrue immense surpluses from
around 1990 to 2020, which are needed if we are to avoid drastic tax in-
creases when the baby-boom generation retires. Of course, we have no
guarantee that we will be able to accrue such massive surpluses. (Boskin
(1986) estimates that they wifi accumulate to a size approximately that of
the entire present national debt.) There may be political pressure to use
Table 9 COMPARISON ACROSS DIVISIONS OF HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS
FOR 1975 COHORT, VARIOUS EARNINGS LEVELS (1985 DOLLARS
DISCOUNTED AT RATE 3 PERCENT TO 1985)
Division of earnings
(Husband-wife)
Total family earnings level
(At 1985 wage index)
10,000 30,000 50,000
1-0 (single earner)
P.V. benefits 37,775 67,464 63,052
P.V.taxes 33,273 99,820 112,081
P.V. transfer 4,502 -32,356 -49,029
Rate of return 3.37% 1.85% 1.36%
2/3½
P.V. benefits 32,052 58,835 67,321
P.V.taxes 32,796 98,387 159,560
P.V. transfer -744 -39,552 -92,239
Rate of return 2.93% 1.49% 0.45%
½-½
P.V. benefits 30,587 54,874 67,152
P.V. taxes 32,560 97,680 162,800
P.V. transfer -1,973 -42,806 -95,648
Rate of return 2.82% 1.29% 0.34%Table 10 TREATMENT OF WIDOWS' OF 1975 COHORT, VARIOUS
EARNINGS LEVELS (1985 DOLLARS DISCOUNTED AT RATE 3 PERCENT
TO 1985)
First earner's or husband's
earnings level
'That is, widows who lose their husbands at age fifty.
"Includes taxes paid by husband before his death.
Table 11 RANGE OF ZERO INCREMENTAL RETURN FOR SECOND
EARNERS, WIDOWS, AND DIVORCED WOMEN (1975 COHORT)
Second earner's or divorced woman's
minimum earnings level to receive
an incremental return'
Widow's minimum earnings level
to receive an incremental return'
Latest age at which widowhood occurs,
and widow first begins work at ½
of husband's wage, to receive an
incremental return'
Latest age at which divorce occurs,
and divorced woman first begins
work at 2/3 of husband's wage, to
receive an incremental return'
'In this simulation, both earners' wages increase at the male age proffle of wages.
Division of earnings
(Husband-wife)
Total family earnings level
(At 1985 wage index)
10,000 30,000 50,000
1-0 (single earner)
P.V. benefits 24,400 46,621 44,594
P.V.taxesb 24,503 73,509 85,835
P.V. transfer -103 -26,888 -41,241
Rate of return 2.99% 1.89% 1.43%
½-½
P.V. benefits 20,046 35,117 43,813
P.V. taxes" 27,220 81,658 134,642
P.V. transfer -7,174 -46,541 -90,828
Rate of return 2.20% 0.79% 0.06%
½-½
P.V. benefits 20,286 35,792 44,652
P.V.taxes" 28,581 85,743 142,905
P.V. transfer -8,295 -49,951 -98,253
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the surplus to bail out Medicare, to raise benefits, or to lower taxes. Stifi,
we present these data as if the Social Security Administration's economic
and demographic intermediate projections will hold, and the system
will have sufficient funds so that tax rates and benefit formulae remain
as now scheduled. We also use the current tax law rather than the one
about to be phased in.
In Table 9, we first note that the lower dollar figures reflect primarily
thirty years of additional discounting. The absolute scale of the system
expands, in fact, with increases in average wages. The earnings levels
presented have increased with real wages as well, so that a person in this
cohort at age forty-five in 2020 wifi be receiving much higher wages than
the 1985 wage index presented here; for example, $30,000 indexed to
1985 would correspond to over $50,000 by 2020. These are stifi constant
1985 dollars; we choose this way of presenting the data to compare per-
sons of approximately the same position in the income distribution.
Note also that the retirement age under current law wifi have risen from
sixty-six to sixty-seven for this cohort relative to the 1945 cohort, that
life expectancy has increased substantially, real wages have increased,
OASI tax rates are somewhat higher, and the benefits would be taxed at
higher tax brackets under the existing income tax (but not under the tax
reform about to be passedwhether that wifi be the tax law in effect
when these persons retire is highly unlikely). The pattern of rates of re-
turn is quite similar for the different types of families and the different
earnings levels. Tables 9 and 10 reflect a similar qualitative pattern, de-
spite the three years of additional discounting making the numbers
smaller, to the corresponding Tables 1 and 6. As earnings levels increase,
rates of return decrease and lifetime transfers become large negative
amounts. As we move from single-earner to two-earner couples, rates of
return decline substantially. Comparing Tables 9 and 10, with the same
caveats we used when comparing Tables 1 and 6 (the partial ex post na-
ture of treatment of widows who are presumed to survive to age fifty
with their husbands), suggests that the rates of return for widows are
much lower and the transfers somewhat smaller (including larger nega-
tive transfers) than those for the couples in Table 9. The striking feature
is that women widowed in middle age are projected to do very poorly
under Social Security into the indefinite future under current law.
Table 11, similar to Table 7, but in this case for the 1975 cohort, presents
comparable information about the second-earner or divorcee's minimum
earnings level to receive incremental returns, the same information for
widows, and the latest age at which widowhood or divorce could occur,
subject to our assumptions, and any incremental returns to be received
on the taxes paid by working widows or divorced women. The pattern is158 BOSKIN & PUFFERT
quite similar to that reported in Table 7. Widows need substantial earn-
ings levels to receive any incremental returnthat is, to switch from the
survivors benefit to their own retired worker benefit. A widow whose
husband has received (in 1985 adjusted and indexed dollars) $30,000 per
year would have to go back to work at age fifty for the remainder of her
work life (assumed to be until age sixty-seven) and earn $22,800 a year in
order to receive any incremental return. Similarly, the same woman would
have to be widowed no later than age forty if she went back to work at
two thirds of her husband's earnings level before she received any incre-
mental return. Analogous data are presented for divorcees and for those
with husbands with different earnings levels.
Again, these data reveal the substantial variation in the treatment of
divorced and widowed women, depending upon such things as the age
at which these events occur, as well as their husbands' or ex-husbands'
earnings, and highlight one of the major issues involved in debates over
earnings sharing as a possible Social Security reform.
7. Conclusion
We have presented the results of a computer simulation of the expected
present value of benefits, taxes, and transfers, and rates of return, and
marginal linkage of benefits and taxes for persons in various income lev-
els and family status. The most striking feature is the enormous variation
in the treatment, both in total and at the margin, Social Security offers
each of these archetypical family types. Perhaps this variation is desir-
able and warranted; still, it has not been systematically presented as an
optimal design for the system, given the magnitude of variation that we
have derived.
These results do point out the tremendous amounts at stake for vari-
ous family types in the Social Security system and any potential reforms
in it. Often these amounts dwarf any conceivable changes in tax burdens
under the individual income tax. For many groups in the population, the
amount of the expected value of the transfers involved exceeds the me-
dian value of a home.
Because Social Security is so important, large, and complex, informa-
tion such as this, despite a history of related studies under earlier ac-
tuarial assumptions and law, seems not to have worked its way to the
general public discourse concerning the efficiency and equity of the de-
sign of the Social Security system. We hope these results will contribute
to a better understanding of how the current Social Security retirement
system, as it is projected into the future, is likely to affect families of dif-
ferent types and circumstances.SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 159
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